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NOTES
DEPORTATION OF ALIEN SEAMEN OWING ALLEGIANCE
TO GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE*
THE threat to the Allied shipping program arising from desertion of alien
seamen in United States ports 1 has occasioned more vigorous eniftrcement
of the Immigration Laws. Since desertion is often motivated by the attractive-
ness of employment in United States defense industries,2 deportation for
surreptitious entry into the country is one method of discouraging it.? From
the legal standpoint, it is normally a simple matter to deport an alien unlav-
fully in this country. For the statute specifies that deportation of aliens shall
"at the option of the Attorney General, be to the country whence they came
or to the foreign port at which such aliens embarked for the United States";
and if the Attorney General chooses to deport the alien to the "country whence
he came" and that country refuses him, the deportee may then be sent to the
state of which he is a citizen.4 But a difficult problem of statutory construc-
tion arises when, as in the case of many deserting seamen, the alien was last
*Delany v. foraitis, 136 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
1. These desertions have, through consequent crew shnrtages, seriously threatened
the Allied shipping program by delaying sailings and preventing the efficient transporta-
tion of supplies. Desertions have reached a peak of four hundred monthly. See War
Shipping Administration, Recruitment and Manning Organization, Information Circular
No. 15 (1943). The situation is particularly grave in view of manpower shortage and
the irreplaceability of the present crew supply of most of the United Nations owing to
enemy occupation of their territory.
2. See Report of the Special Interdepartmental Committee on Maritime Labor
(1942) 2-3; War Shipping Administration, Recruitment and Manning Organization,
Information Circular No. 4 (1942) 1.
3. See affidavit submitted by Marshall E. Dimuck. Director, Recruitment and
Manning Organization, War Shipping Administration, in the case of Delany v. Moraitis,
46 F. Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942).
4. The statute reads: "The deportation of aliens . . . shall, at the option of the
Attorney General, be to the country whence they came or to the foreign port at which
such aliens embarked for the United States; . . . or, if such aliens are held by the coun-
try from which they entered . . . not to be subjects or citizens of such country, and such
country refuses to permit their reentry, . . . then to the country of which such aliens are
subjects or citizens . . . ." 32 STAT. 1218, 1221 (1903), 34 STAT. 904, 905, 903 (1907),
8 U. S. C. § 156 (1941).
The administrator's discretion to deport to the "country whence he came" or to the
port of embarkation is subject to judicial control only if abused. McDonough v. Tilling-
hast, 56 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; United States v. Testolini, 4 F. (2d) 76 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1925). But the courts have insisted that the "country whence [he] came!'
must refuse the deportee before he can be sent to the country uf his allegiance. Gorcevich
v. Zurbrick, 48 F. (2d) 1054, 1055 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); United States ex rel. Natali v.
Day, 45 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
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domiciled in what is now an enemy occupied country with an exiled govern-
ment functioning in London and he is rejected by the country whence he
embarked for the United States.
Presented with this problem in the recent case of Delany v. Moraitis, 5 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that a deserting Greek seaman
could be deported to England, and thus placed under the jurisdiction of the
Greek government-in-exile, on the theory that "country whence [he] came"
means the government exercising sovereign power over the deportee. The
court also thought that a refusal to satisfy the requests of the Greek govern-
ment-in-exile for deportation to England would, in view of its recognition
by the United States, amount to denial of that government's right to exercise
jurisdiction over absent nationals.0 But the right of another government over
an absent national would seem irrelevant, since deportation, unlike extradi-
tion, is the exercise of an absolute power of a state.7 In the United States,
where the exercise of the deportation power is controlled by statute, the alien
has an absolute right to be deported only to one of the places authorized
therein.
The court's decision would, therefore, seem to rest on its interpretation of
"country whence [an alien] came" as the government to which he owes alle-
giance rather than the territory from which he came. In the single Supreme
Court decision involving the phrase, Mensevich v. Tod,8 it was held that if
the part of the territory of a state from which the alien came is acquired by
another state, he is deportable to the acquiring state. The full significance
of this holding would appear to depend largely on whether the deportee was
at the time of deportation a citizen of the acquiring or of the ceding state.
For if the deportee had become a citizen of the acquiring state, the case
would support a personal sovereignty interpretation. It appears, however,
that in this case the alien was deported to the acquiring state even though he
had retained the nationality of the ceding state, because he was resident abroad
during the cession and the nationality of a successor state is generally acquired
only by habitual residents who continue to reside in the ceded territory. It
5. 136 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
6. Id. at 131.
7. See (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1358, 1363 note 25.
8. 264 U. S. 134 (1924).
9. ". .. subjects of the ceding state who are born on the ceded territory but have
their domicile abroad do not become ipso facto by the cession subjects of the acquiring
state." 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) 436, n. 3; see also I FAU-
CHILLE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1922) 427; FoorE, PRlVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(4th ed. 1925) 11; 2 HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1908) 509-10; HARVAD
LAw SCHOOL, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1929) art. 18; KEITH, Tus THEORY
oF STATE SUCCESSION (1907) 92; Treaty of Riga (1921) art. 6; Treaty of Versailles
(1919) arts. 84, 85, 105; Engel v. Zurbrick, 51 F. (2d) 632, 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931)
(". . . since, on March 18, 1921, they were not residing in the formerly Russian terri-
tory which became Poland, thus ipso facto then becoming Polish citizens, and since they
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may be, however, that the Court did not consider the question of the deportee's
nationality, since its only proffered rationale was the vague statement that
"'country' means the state which, at the time of deportation, includes the place
from which the alien came."
Apart from the Mensevich case, there are strong indications that "country
whence [an alien] came" means country territorially rather than governmen-
tally. The statute itself authorizes deportation to the place of the alien's citi-
zenship only after he has been refused by the "country whence [he] came." 10
In the past, moreover, courts have generally held domicile rather than national-
ity determinative of "country whence [an alien] came." 11 While it is true
that in some instances the alien has actually been sent to the state of which
he was a citizen, in those cases the state of nationality either coincided with
the deportee's last domicile or he had been refused by the "country whence
[he] came."L- Whenever nationality and domicile differed, however, the
alien was held deportable to the latter. 3
Nor would the cases in which aliens were not in fact deported to countries
with unrecognized governments seem to support the identification of
"country whence they came" with state of citizenship. For in those cases, the
alien was specifically held deportable to the territory of last domicile even
though the government there had not been recognized by the United States
did not file their option for Polish citizenship before September 24, 1924, they lost their
right-until then continued-to acquire that status."). But see HL., ITNMU.ATIheAL
LAw (8th ed. 1924) 688; Treaty of Trianon (1920) art. 61; Treaty of St. Germain (1919)
art. 70.
10. See United States ex tel. Boraca v. Schlotfeldt, 109 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) ; Gorcevich v. Zurbrick, 48 F. (2d) 1054, 1055 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) ; United States
cx rel. Natali v. Day, 45 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); see note 4 sipra.
11. See cases cited notes 12 and 13 infra.
12. United States ex re. Boraca v. Schlotfeldt, 109 F. (2d) 105, 109 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) ; United States ex tel. Di Paola v. Reiner, 102 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ;
Schenck ex reL. Capodilupo v. Ward, SO F. (2d) 422, 426 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935); Self V.
Nagle, 14 F. (2d) 416, 417 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Lazzaro v. Weedin, 4 F. (2d) 704
(C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Singh v. United States, 243 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); cf.
Frick v. Lewis, 195 Fed. 693, 700 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) ; Thack v. Zurbriclr, 51 F. (2d)
634 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). But see United States ex rel. Hudack Y. UI, 20 F. Supp. 928,
930 (N. D. N. Y. 1937), aff'd, 96 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), Blumen v. Haft,
78 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 644 (1935).
The domicile of origin is retained until one of choice is acquired elsewhere. See
1 BF.ALE, CONFLICr OF LAws (1935) § 14.1.
13. United States ex reL. Mazur v. Commissioner of Immigration, 101 F. (2d) 707,
709 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; McDonough v. Tillinghast, 56 F. (2d) 156, 158 (C. C. A. 1st,
1932) ; Gorcevich v. Zurbrick, 48 F. (2d) 1054 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Ex parle Guest,
287 Fed. 884, 891 (D. R. L 1923) ; United States v. Sisson, 230 Fed. 974 (C. C. A. 2d,
1916) ; Ex parte Gyt, 210 Fed. 918, 923 (D. N. D. 1914) ; cf. Wenglinsky v. Zurbrich,
38 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), rev'd per curiam, 282 U. S. 793 (1930) ; Ex parte
Mfathews, 277 Fed. 857 (NV. D. Wash. 1921). But see (1942) 42 COL. L Rz,. 1343,
1344-45.
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and could not be deemed to have jurisdiction over them ;14 and actual depor-
tation was precluded only by the impossibility of executing a deportation war-
rant in the absence of diplomatic relations through which to secure the neces-
sary passports.15 Moreover, if deportation to an exiled government in Eng-
land is not permitted by the statute, it cannot be justified as a first step in
the ultimate deportation to the place of last domicile, because the United States
would lose control of the alien upon his arrival in England.10 Finally, it
might be argued, on policy grounds, that a governmental interpretation of the
phrase is undesirable. For since the statute does not differentiate between
different kinds of aliens, all aliens similarly situated, whether seamen or not,
would have to be deported to England,17 and this would create serious admin-
istrative problems and work substantial injustice.
Although it would seem that these seamen are not deportable to their exiled
governments, the same purpose may be effectuated by their detention pending
actual deportation and release on condition that they reship foreign. For a de-
portee may be detained for a "reasonable time" pending deportation, the length
of the period varying with the circumstances.' 8 Present enemy occupation of the
territories to which these seamen are deportable, a temporary war exigency
expected to continue for a limited time only, would appear to warrant an
extension of the period during which they can be held. 19 Moreover, the sea-
man would not have to be released on bail pending deportation. For depart-
mental bail, pending administrative hearings, 20 may be granted at the discre-
14. Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F. (2d) 13, 16 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Wenglinsky v.
Zurbrick, 38 F. (2d) 985, 986 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; Ex parte Mathews, 277 Fed. 857
(W. D. Wash. 1921). But see (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 1343, 1344.
15. Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F. (2d) 13, 16 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Wenglinsky v.
Zurbrick, 38 F. (2d) 985, 986 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; Ex parte Mathews, 277 Fed. 857
(W. D. Wash. 1921); see CLARx, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS (1931) 407-08.
16. Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F. (2d) 13, 16 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ; United States
cx rel. Hudak v. Uhl, 20 F. Supp. 938, 930 (N. D. N. Y. 1937); cf. Wolck v. Weediln,
58 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
17. The exiled governments could not then refuse to accept aliens not seamen, since
in international law a state is under a duty to accept its nationals deported from another
state. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, op. cit. supra note 9, art 20.
18. Compare Seif v. Nagle, 14 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) ; United States cx
rtl. Lisafield v. Smith, 2 F. (2d) 90 (W. D. N. Y. 1924) ; United States cx rel. Ross
v. Wallis, 279 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; In re Kosopud, 272 Fed. 330 (N. D. Ohio
1920). Under normal conditions this period does not exceed a few months. See Caranica
v. Nagle, 28 F. (2d) 955, 957 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) ; United States cx rel. Ross v. Wallis,
279 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
19. Compare Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F. (2d) 13, 16 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ; Colyer
v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd on other grounds, Skeffington v. Kat-
zeff, 277 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922).
20. 39 STAT. 891 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 156 (1941), reads: "Pending the final disposal
of the case of any alien . . ., he may be released under a bond in the penalty of not less
than $500 . . . conditioned that such alien shall be produced when required for a hear-




tion 2 1 of the Department of Justice. And court bail pending habeas corpus
proceedings and execution of the warrant is likewise discretionary--- The
fact that these seamen are deserters from an allied nation would seem to be
sufficient reason for refusing them bail.23 And the wisdom of such a refusal
is apparent in the light of the fact that these men may, at the discretion of
the Department, be released on condition that they reship foreign - l and that
detention would, therefore, probably induce return to sea. Return would not
be encouraged, of course, if on reshipping foreign the seaman were to be prose-
cuted for desertion. 25 But it seems likely that exiled governments, faced with
21. The great majority of courts have held that departmental bail is discretionary
and that the deportee has no right to it. United States ex rel. Zapp v. Director, 120 F.
(2d) 762 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Ex parte Perkov. 45 F. Supp. 064, M6 (S. D. Cal.
1942); United States cx reL. Pappis v. Tomlinson, 45 F. Supp. 447 (N. D. Ohio 1942);
United States ex reL. Ioannis v. Garfinkel, 44 F. Supp. 518 (f. D. Pa. 1942) ; United
States Y. Pizzarusso, 28 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D. Conn. 1939).
A few courts have considered departmental bail mandatory. Prentis v. Manoogian,
16 F. (2d) 422 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; see (1941) 10 IiT. Jamr. Ass'x BuLm 15, 16.
The exercise of this discretionary power has been subjected to judicial alteration
only when abused. United States ex rel. Pappis v. Tomlinson, 45 F. Supp. 447 (AV. D.
Ohio 1942); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 77 (D. Mass. 1920), re'd on other
grounds, Skefington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922).
22. United States ex rel. Carapa v. Curran, 297 Fed. 946, 952 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924),
36 A. L. R. 877, 887; In re Hanoff, 39 F. Supp. 169, 171 (N. D. Cal. 1941) ; Ng Hen v.
Sisson, 220 Fed. 538, 540 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
Some courts deem the power to bail inherent in the court. In re Lum Poy, 128 Fed.
974 (C. C. D. Mont. 1904) ; United States v. Fah Chung, 132 Fed. 109 (S. D. Ga. 1904) ;
see Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40, 63 (1903) ; (1941) 10 Ixv. Jun. Ass':. Bun.. 15, 16.
The United States Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeal are specifically
authorized by statute to grant bail pending appeals from decisions refusing a writ of
habeas corpus. REv. STAT. 765 (1875), 43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. §§464, 463
(1941).
23. Compare In re Hanoff, 39 F. Supp. 169 (N. D. Calif. 1941).
24. Although not specifically authorized by statute, the courts have sanctioned the
practice of the immigration authorities of allowing the deportable alien to depart volun-
tarily, and will review the administrative determination only in case of abuse. Ex tarte
Panagopoulos, 3 F. Supp. 222 (S. D. Cal. 1933); cf. United States ex rel. Mazur v.
Commissioner, 101 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Hajdamacha ,. Karnuth, 23 F.
(2d) 956 (W. D. N. Y. 1927); see Fafalios v. Doak, 50 F. (2d) 640 (App. D. C. 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 651 (1931) ; CL Rx, DEPoRTATioq oF Auaxs (1931) 469-70, 12.
The practice of allowing voluntary departure would seem to be recognized by section
180(b) of the Immigration Laws. 45 STAT. 1552 (1929), 8 U. S. C. § 10(b) (1941).
But see United States ex rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls, 47 F. Supp. 201, 203 (D. Mass. 1942).
Many of the deserting seamen arrested returned to sea voluntarily. See affidavit sub-
mitted by Dimock, note 3 supra.
25. Since most United Nations consider seamen members of the armed forces, they
could be prosecuted for desertion in the special maritime courts of the e.iled govern-
ments set up in British territory. Allied Forces Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Gso. VI, c. 51; Allied
Powers Act, 1941, 4 & 5 GEO. VI, c. 21. Although detention would involve some delay
and expense, the same objection could be made against deportation proceedings.
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a grave shortage of seamen, would refrain from inflicting punishment which
would delay return to work. In view, however, of the low wages, poor food,
maltreatment, unsanitary living quarters, and inadequate safety equipment
aboard foreign ships, 20 many seamen may prefer detention in this country to
reshipping foreign. Alleviation of these conditions would, then, seem necessary
if those who have deserted are t6 be induced to return to sea and if desertions
are to be prevented in the future.
LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN
GOVERNMENTS FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF THEIR
MILITARY PERSONNEL
ALTHOUGH sovereign immunities to suit derived from national 1 and inter-
national 2 law absolve the United States and Canadian Governments from
liability for the torts of their military personnel except upon a consensual basis,
these Governments have found it politically expedient to provide compensation
26. See War Shipping Administration, Recruitment and Manning Organization,
Information Circular No. 4 (1942) 1-3; (1942) 11 INT. J'uD. Ass'N BuLL. 44. The
efforts of foreign consuls to persuade some detained seamen "to take employment on
foreign-flag ships . . . were unsuccessful principally because of (1) extremely poor
food served on foreign-flag ships; (2) low wages, bad conditions, and inadequate safety
equipment on foreign-flag vessels; and (3) extremely unsanitary and unhealthy living
conditions . . . ." AmERicAN CommUr roi Po'rrECION oF FOREIGN BORN, M o-
RANDUM ON MANNING oF FOREIGN-FLAG SHIPS (1942) 2. Since on American ships pay
is approximately $300 monthly as compared to an average of $100 on foreign ships, an
unjustified disparity in view of substantially equal earnings, many seamen have in the past
deserted to join American ships. Id. at 2; Report of Interdepartmental Committee on
Maritime Labor, note 1 supra. This situation has been stopped by the War Shipping
Administrator's order forbidding further employment of foreign seamen in American
and Panamanian boats. Immigration and Naturalization Service Rule 75, 7 FED. RVG.
2761-62 (1942).
1. The rule of sovereign immunity to suit is prevalent throughout Anglo-American
municipal law. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 1-19.
For application of the rule in United States courts, see Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S.
400 (1902); German Bank of Memphis v. United States, 148 U. S. 573 (1893) ; Gib-
bons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269 (U. S. 1868). See as examples of English interpre-
tation, Hutton v. Secretary of State for War, 43 T. L. R. 106 (Ch. 1926); Raleigh v.
Goschen, [1898] 1 Ch. 73; Macgregor v. Lord Advocate, [1921] Sess. Cas. 847. In
the Macgregor case an action against the War Department to recover for the negligent
driving of a sergeant was dismissed, because an action does not lie against the Crown
in respect of a wrongful act committed by one of its servants.
2. For a discussion of the immunity of a foreign sovereign from the territorial
jurisdiction of another, see 2 MOORE, INrERNATIoNAL LAw DIGEST (1906) §§250-58; see
also 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1937) § 144.
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to civilians injured by the tortious conduct of their armed forces. For suits
against members of the military services as individual citizens 3 are inherently
unsatisfactory. In the United States, for example, courts have discretion to
stay the proceedings under provisions of the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act ;4
any soldier has the privilege of removing a suit against him to a federal court ;5
and, once in court, he may protect himself by the sanction of any order from
a superior which falls within the vague characterization "not palpably illegal." 0
Moreover, even this theoretical possibility of suit does not exist without dip-
lomatic adjustment when the military personnel are present in a foreign state,
for as members of the armed forces they share the immunity of the sovereign.7
And although in the case of injury to property, the 105th Article of War 8
provides for collection of damages from the pay of the offender, this provision
is applicable only when his action can be characterized as "depredation, wilful
misconduct or such recldess disregard of property rights as to carry an impli-
cation of guilty intent." 9 Systems of state responsibility have, therefore,
evolved, in both Canada and the United States. The present United States
system is an expansion of administrative methods developed under legislation
which creates a limited state liability for damage resulting from Government
activities, while the Canadian system is a synthesis of Canada's experience
with similar legislation and of methods developed during the first World War
for handling the torts of soldiers abroad.
3. This opportunity to sue the offending individual as an ordinary citizen is the
practical justification proffered for the non-liability of the State in Anglo-American law.
See Borchard, supra note 1, at 2, criticizing the theory.
4. 54 STAT. 1181 (1940), 50 U. S. C § 521 (1940). The English Army Act pro-
rides that no soldier shall be liable to be taken out of forces or compelled to appear in
person before any court except where he is charged or convicted of a crime, or the debt
or damages are over thirty pounds. Though the petitioner may proceed to judgment in
such action after due notice to the soldier, he may not have recourse against the person,
pay, arms, ammunition, equipment, and regimental necessities, or clothing of the soldier.
44 & 45 Vicr., c. 58, § 144 (1881).
5. 39 STAT. 650, 669, Art. 117 (1916), 10 U. S. C. § 1589 (1940).
6. See McCall v. McDowell, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235 (C. C. Cal. 1867); Despan v. Olney,
7 Fed. Cas. 534 (C. C. R. I. 1852) ; Turney, Civil and Criminal Accontability of 3fcm-
bers of the Army and Navy (1918) 24 CASE & Comms 297; Ackerly, Legal Responsi-
bilit y of Obedient Soldier or Militiaman (1917) 22 C.,s- & Comm 739; Brown, Mili-
tary Orders as a Defense in Civil Courts (1918) 3 Vino. LAY., REG. (:;.s.) 641; (1942)
55 Hxv. L. Rav. 651.
7. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 431-35 (1902); The Exchange, 7
Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812) ; 2 M oaE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 251; 1 OFFmrr, op. cit.
stpra note 2, §§ 443-46. The immunity remains, however, only so long as the soldiers
are on duty or within the place where the force is stationed.
8. 41 STAT. 808, art. 105 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1577 (1941).
9. See 8 FED. REG. 15813 (1943), interpreting article 105 to include damage caused
by "riotous, violent, or disorderly conduct," and removing from its scope those claims
falling under the recent act. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), 31 U. S. C. A. § 224 (Curr. Serv.
1943) as interpreted by 8 FED. REG. 14655 (1943). See page 192 infra.
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In the early years of the last war, Canada, following the practice in the
United Kingdom, defended individual officers in civil suits and paid judg-
ments against them when the state would have been liable, except for the rule
of immunity, as any other master, for the torts of its servants.10 Similarly, the
United States in France permitted a judicial determination of such claims by
waiver of its sovereign immunity to suit.1 In 1917, however, when the inde-
pendent status of Canadian troops in England was established,' 2 Canada, still
admitting no legal liability, adopted an administrative system of compensa-
tion.13 "Compassionate grants" were made, by the legal authorities at the
military headquarters in London, to those claimants whose injuries were occa-
sioned by the negligence of any officer acting within the scope of his author-
ity.14 When a claim was denied, the claimant was informed that he might seek
relief against the individual in court, but that the Crown would pay neither
the costs of the suit nor the judgment.15 Claims from insurance companies
were disallowed on the theory that they could anticipate such accidents in the
cost of their policies.16 While the United States authorized in 1918 an
administrative settlement of claims "under Regulations made by the Secretary
of State," 17 it, like Canada, developed no principle of legal liability, since the
claims were payable "according to the law or practice governing the military
forces of the country" in which they arose.
10. See Canadian Militar~v Law Overseas (1920) 56 CAN. L. J. 121, 122.
11. Id. at 121. England refused to waive its immunity and claims were settled by
British commissioners. Ibid. For criticism of this immunity from jurisdiction of French
courts by English commentator, see (1915) 139 L. T. 547.
12. Canadian Military Law Overseas (1920) 56 CAN. L. J. 41 and 121.
13. Id. at 123.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 123-24.
17. 40 STAT. 532 (1918), 10 U. S. C. (Supp. II, 1942), § 223a, repealed by 57 STAT.
66 (1943) § 5. See English Indemnity Act, 1920, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 48, § 1(d). This
section permitted the institution of civil proceedings in England with the consent of the
Attorney General (or in Scotland of the Lord Advocate) in "respect of damage to per-
son or property in any foreign country." Consent was authorized only if the person
would have had a remedy had the act been done in the United Kingdom and if no other
provision for the settlement of the claim had been made by treaty or convention.
Today England retains the fiction of absolute sovereign immunity, but certain
extra-legal compensation practices have developed. A commission in the Army Depart-
ment, for example, makes payments to civilians injured by military vehicles if the act
of the individual concerned was one in respect to which the ordinary master would have
been liable for the torts of his servant. See mention of this commission in 367 PIL. D .
(5th ser. 1940) 375; 372 PAIU. DEB. (5th ser. 1941) 962 (payment to be made on mas-
ter-servant principles) ; 372 PMURt DEB. (5th ser. 1941) 474 (discussion of case of a
civilian killed by an army lorry driven without lights and on wrong side of road during
air raid in Portsmouth; liability was denied). The English governmental departments
also retain the practice of paying costs and judgments in suits against employees as indi-
viduals for acts done within the scope of authority. See (1941) 91 L. J. 145 (taken from
debates in House of Lords) ; see also the statement of the Lord Chancellor that "it has
been the invariable practice of all Government Departments to provide the funds required
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Today, almost all payments made to claimants by the United States and
Canada have a statutory and legal basis.18 In Canada, the Exchequer Court
has had, since 1927, jurisdiction to hear every claim arising from injury caused
by any officer or servant of the Crown acting within the scope of his duty or
employment; 19 and in the case of automobile accidents, this general liability
has been replaced by a recent Order In Council which expressly provides
that civilians may recover up to $200 for injuries to person or to property
"resulting from the alleged negligence of any officer or servant of the Crown
in the maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle while acting . . .within
the scope of his duties or employment." 20 Still another order authorizes com-
pensation regardless of negligence for injury suffered because of falling air-
craft.21
In the United States, several statutes render the Government liable, irrespec-
tive of negligence, for damage to property up to $500 or $1,000 caused by
various army activities,22 and, also, for injury to person or property to the
extent of $250 arising from the operation of aircraft.2s Until recently, claims
to satisfy any judgment obtained against the driver" of a service vehicle, who as on
duty at the time the accident occurred. Ibid. The departments will not provide such
funds, however, in cases of the driver's own "frolic." See also (1941) L J. 6 and 12,
and Canadian Military Law Overseas (1920) 56 CA. L. J. 121, 122, for discussion of
the same practice during the last war.
18. Thus, the fiction of sovereign immunity from liability has been dispelled.
19. Exchequer Court Act, 1 CANx. Rv. STAT. c. 34 (1927). See the administrative
procedure authorized by Order in Council P. C. 80/1045 (Mar. 19, 1940).
20. Order in Council P. C. 59/7305, 5 Poci.Amw.TIoxs & Ornzas xI COUNCIL
RELATING TO THE WAR (1942) 167 (hereafter cited as Proc. & OnRDzns T. COUNCIL). See
also Order in Council P. C. 49/11590, 13 CAN. WAR ORfIS & RGULATIONS (1942)
757. These orders are applicable only to injuries "in Canada." The statutory
authority for all Orders in Council regulating claims because of acts committed by Cana-
dian military personnel is found in the War Mleasures Act, 4 CAN. Rv. STAT. C. 205
(1927). An administrative procedure has also been established to handle claims arising
out of damage caused by manoeuvres. See Order in Council P. C. 5134, 5 Pnoc. & Ornzns
ix COUNCIL (1941) 39. And a recent order establishes a similar mechanism for handling
claims arising out of the normal training of small bodies of troops. Order in Council
P. C. 57/897, 5 CaN. WAR ORnas & REGULATIONS (1943) 293.
21. Order in Council P. C. 67/2980, 4 Paoc. & ORDERs In COUNCIL (1941) 122,
revoked and replaced by Order in Council P. C. 46/3017, 7 Proc. & Omras IN Couucu.
(1942) 29 (to include claims of "governments").
22. 56 STAT. 615 (1942), 31 U. S. C. §223 (1940) (damage incident to training
practice operation or maintenance of Army); 54 STAT. 23 (1940) (damage occa-
sioned by field exercises); 50 STAT. 461 (1937), 31 U. S. C. § 215 (1941) (for
damages incident to operations of National Guard); 41 STAT. 1015 (1920), 31 U. S. C.
§ 564 (1940) (damage incident to construction and improvements on rivers and harbors
works), repealed by 57 STAT. 372 (1943) § 5; 37 STAT. 516 (1912) (compensation for
damage caused by heavy gun fire and target practice, manoeuvres or other military
operations), repealed by 57 STAT. 372 (1943).
23. 56 STAT. 620 (1942), 31 U. S. C. § 224 (Supp. II, 1942). See 7 FL.. Rmn. 3533
(1942). For interpretation and application of this provision, see also 2 BuuL. J. Av.
GEN. No. 5, at 195 (1943).
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for tortious conduct of the forces were handled under a statute enacted in
1922, which made the "negligence" of any officer or employee of the Govern-
ment acting within the scope of his employment the basis of claims for prop-
erty damage up to $1,000.24 But this statute has been rendered inapplicable
by an act passed in July, 1943,25 which consolidates the majority of claims
against the War Department into a cohesive system of administration. It
allows recovery up to $1,000 for damage to person 20 or property caused
either by military personnel or civilian employees acting within the scope of
their employment as well as for damage otherwise incident to non-combatant
activities. Unlike the Canadian system, where recoupment on a graduated
scale is made from the pay of the offender if the negligent act involved is not
of a "minor character," 27 liability of the United States for negligent acts of
personnel committed within the scope of authority entails total responsibility
for payment of compensation.
Administrative procedure employed by the United States for hearing claims
is comprehensive though cumbersome. 28 After the claimant has submitted a
sworn statement covering the essential elements of his claim, a Board of officers
investigates the incident which caused the loss, hearing witnesses and permit-
ting cross-examination. If the Board recommends the claim, it is sent to the
appropriate statutorily designated officer for further consideration; and, if
the claim is eventually paid, the award must be accepted in entire satisfaction
of the legal claim. 29
24. 42 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C. § 215 (1941). For administrative interpreta-
tion of the act of 1922, see 10 CODE FED. REG. (Supp. 1939) §36.146(b). See also DIa.
Ops. J. ADv. GEN. 1912-40, § 713(1) using as criteribn for "scope of employment" the rule
laid down in Conchin v. El Paso & S. W. R. R., 13 Ariz. 259, 108 Pac. 260 (1910). The
act was rendered inapplicable to army injuries by 57 STAT. 372 (1943).
25. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), 31 U. S. C. A. §224j. (Curr. Serv. 1943). For interpreta-
tion and application of this statute see 2 BULL. J. ADv. GEN. No. 7 at 274-75, No. 8 at
314-15, No. 9 at 346-48 (1943).
26. Formerly only 56 STAT. 620 (1940), 31 U. S. C. §224 (1940) (operation of air-
craft) allowed a recovery for damage to the person.
27. Order in Council P. C. 80/1045 (Mar. 19, 1940) ; Order in Council P. C. 59/7305,
5 PROC. & ORDERs IN CouNcIL (1942) 166. See Order in Council P. C. 49/11590, 13
CAN. WAR ORDERS & REGULATIONS (1942) 757 (establishing a lower scale of reim-
bursement for women). The same principle of recoupment is applied to acts committed
abroad. See Order in Council P. C. 29/2544 §4(b), 4 PRoc. & OaRDms IN COUNCIL
(1941) 111; Order in Council P. C. 59/7305, 5 PROC. & ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1942) 167;
Order in Council P. C. 54/5095, 7 PRoC. & ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1942) 152 (no reilm-
bursement for claims arising from accidents, collisions in which Canadian ships are in-
volved. But see Order in Council P. C. 62/11160, 10 CAN. WAR ORDERS & REGULATIONS
(1942) 599 (amending P. C. 29/2544, 4 PRoc. & ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1941)-acts abroad
-to limit reimbursement to those cases involving recklessness, undue carelessness or in-
tentional wrongdoing).
28. For the most recent statement of this procedure, see 8 FED. REG. 7213 (1943),
as amended by 8 FED. REG. 14655 (1943) ; see also (1942) 10 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 473.
29. See 8 FED. REG. 7213 (1943); (1942) 10 GEo. WAsu. L. Rav. 473.
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NOTES
Claims for injuries caused by military personnel outside of Canada and the
United States are handled under recent Canadian Orders in Cotmcil .'9 and a
United States statute a.3  The Canadian order authorizes civilians in the United
Kingdom injured in person or property through the negligent and tortious
acts of Canadian military, naval, and air force personnel to recover up to
$1,000 from the Canadian Government on claims which would lie against the
Crown in the "Right of the Dominion of Canada." 32 This constitutes an
express admission that the Crown is legally liable at least for those acts of its
soldiers in a foreign country which are committed within the scope of their
authority ;33 and it establishes a mechanism for applying in a modified form
the rule of the Fourth Hague Convention which states that a belligerent "shall
be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming a part of its armed
forces." 4
The procedure first created by these orders was substantially the same as
that employed in the last war,33 but the course of administration has necessi-
30. Order in Council P. C. 5299, 3 Paoc. & ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1940) 104 (army
and air force and civilian personnel employed by Department of National Defence), re-
scinded and replaced by Order in Council P. C. 29/2544, 4 Pnoc. & OnDzrs I: CoUNcI.
(1941) 110 (establishing Claims Commission), as amended by Order in Council P. C.
11/3550, 4 PRoc. & ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1941) 149 (to include naval personnel). Order
in Council P. C. 50/6954, 5 PRoc. & ORms IN COUNCIL (1942) 147 (construction of
P. C. 29/2544 where United Kingdom military vehicles also involved), Order in Coun-
cil P. C. 40/8600, 5 Pnoc. & ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1942) 167 (extending construction
authorized by P. C. 50/6954, supra, to Naval and Air Force vehicles); Order in Council
P. C. 52/8600, 5 PROc. & ORDERS Ix COUNCIL (1942) 274 (exempting accidents, collisions
and like incidents occurring within the territorial waters of Great Britain and the conti-
nent of Europe from application of P. C. 11/3550, supra, and subjecting them to Admir-
alty practice), Order in Council P. C. 25/1249, 6 PRoc. & ORERs In CouNcn (1942)
116; Order in Council P. C. 62/11160, 11 CAN. WAR ORDERs & REGULATIONS (1942)
599; and Order in Council P. C. 40/1050, 6 CAN. WAR ORDERS & REGU.ATIoNs (1943)
372.
31. 55 STAT. 880 (1942), 31 U. S. C. §224(d) (Supp. II, 1942), as amended by 57
STAT. 66 (1943), 31 U. S. C. A. §§224(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (Curr. Sern. 1943) (ex-
cluding claims of enemy nationals, etc.).
32. Order in Council P. C. 5299, 3 PRoc. & ORDERS IxN COUNCIL (1941) 104; Order
in Council P. C. 29/2544, 4 PROC. & ORDERS IN CouNcir. (1941) 111.
33. The Commission may, however, assume a responsibility broader than the master-
servant principle through its power to settle claims on an ex gratia basis, if "such a claim
should in the interests of the service be entertained." Order in Council P. C. 29/2544,
4 PRoC. & ORDERS IN CouCIc (1941) 111. Similarly damage claims incident to "billeting
or quartering," "training or manoeuvres," or "alleged by any person, corporation or
authority to have been caused by such personnel" may be considered "whether or not
[the personnel were] engaged within the scope of their duties or employment." Order in
Council P. C. 25/1249, 6 PRoc. & ORDERS IN Couxcu. (1942) 116.
34. Second Hague Conference, Convention IV, art. 3. See BoncuArm, DIPLontAwc
PROTcrioN OF CrrIzENs ABRoAD (1915) § 99; cf. 2 OPPENHEIM, TERzA-noiAL LAW
(6th ed. 1940) §§ 259a, b; 1 OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 2, § 163.
35. See Order in Council P. C. 5299, 3 PRoc. & ORDERS nI CoUNcI. (1941) 104.
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tated modifications. The handling of claims has been centralized in one com-
mission-composed of a Deputy Judge Advocate General, the Deputy
Adjutant General, and the Assistant Judge Advocate General-at the military
headquarters in the United Kingdom.3 6 Since many of the claims are sub-
mitted by insurance companies, the Commission has been given power to work
out forebearance agreements with these companies.8 7
The United States statute vests in the Secretaries of War and the Navy
power to appoint claims commissions in foreign countries or their possessions
to handle claims up to $5,000 for damages to property both public and private
incident to the movement of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces.38
Negligence is not a prerequisite to recovery under the statute, but contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the claimant, his agent, or employees will bar
a claim.89 The responsibility of the United States is not limited to the official
acts of its agents, for all bona fide claims are within the statute,40 notwith-
standing the fact that the particular damage may have been caused by officers
or employees acting outside the scope of their employment. Thus, the dimen-
sions of both legal and financial liability are broader than the Canadian.
The effectiveness of the various administrative systems remains as yet to
be ascertained. Limitations as to the amount of recovery and the legal liabil-
ity for which the governments will hold themselves responsible circumscribe
the effectiveness of both the United States and Canadian systems. Neverthe-
less, an administrative determination allowing, as it does, for adjustment to
the rhythm of army discipline and routine, would seem preferable to any
method of private litigation.
36. Order in Council P. C. 29/2544, 4 PRoc. & OnEs IN COUN cIL (1941) 111.
37. Ibid.
38. The Coast Guard is also included when acting for the Army. See 55 STAT. 880
(1942), 31 U. S. C. §224d (Supp. II, 1942), as amended by 57 STAT. 66 (1943), 31
U. S. C. A. § 224d, e, f, g, h, i (Curr. Serv. 1943). For administrative interpretation,
see 8 FED. REG. 8247 (1943). The statute authorizing compensation for damage caused
by aircraft was, also, applicable to damage caused abroad. See 56 STAT. 620 (1942), 31
U. S. C. § 224 (Supp. II, 1942).
39. 8 FED. REGo. 8047 (1943).
40. Ibid. This is substantially the rule of the Second Hague Conference, Conven-
tion IV, art. 3. See note 34 supra.
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